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Susan A. Sherer
College of Business and Economics
Lehigh University

ABSTRACT
This article is the first of two whose goal is to advance the discussion of IS risk by addressing
limitations of the current IS risk literature. These limitations include:
•

inconsistent or unclear definitions of risk,

•

limited applicability of risk models,

•

frequent omission of the temporal nature of risk, and

•

lack of an easily communicated organizing framework for risk factors.

This article presents a general, but broadly adaptable model of system-related risk. The
companion article, CAIS Volume 14, Article 2 [Sherer and Alter, 2004] focuses on IS risk factors
and how these factors can be organized.
This article starts by identifying criteria for a general, but broadly applicable risk model. It
compares alternative conceptualizations of risk and provides clarifications of the definitions of risk
and of different treatments of goals, expectations, and baselines for assessing risk. It presents
several of the risk models in the IS literature and discusses the temporal nature of risk.
Based on that background it presents a general and broadly adaptable model of risk that
encompasses:
•

goals and expectations,

•

risk factors and other sources of uncertainty,

•

the operation of the system or project whose risks are being managed,

•

the risk management effort,

•

the possible outcomes and their probabilities,

•

impacts on other systems,
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•

and the resulting financial gains or losses.

The model’s adaptability allows users to eliminate facets that are not important for their purposes.
For example, the majority of current practitioners would probably think of risk in terms of negative
outcomes rather than the full distribution of possible outcomes. A comparison of the general
model with other risk models in the IS literature shows that it covers most of the ideas expressed
by previous IS risk models while also providing a practical approach that managers can use for
thinking about IS risk at whatever level of detail makes sense to them.
Keywords: information systems risk, risk factors, risk components, risk model, risk management,
work system, project risk, software risk, work system framework, success factors, emergent risks
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is the first of two whose goal is to advance the discussion of IS risk. The article
presents a general, but broadly adaptable model of system-related risk. The model applies both
to information systems in operation and projects aimed at creating or improving information
systems. The second article [Sherer and Alter, 2004] discusses the risk components and many
risk factors in the IS literature. It shows how the risk factors can be organized to make them more
accessible and more easily communicated to business managers.
This article starts by identifying criteria for a general, but broadly applicable risk model. It
compares alternative conceptualizations of risk and provides clarifications related to definitions of
risk, different treatments of goals, expectations, and baselines for assessing risk. It mentions
several of the risk models in the IS literature and discusses the temporal nature of risk. Based on
that background it presents a general and broadly adaptable model of risk that encompasses:
•

Goals and expectations

•

Risk factors and other sources of uncertainty

•

Temporal relationships between goals, initial risk factors, emergent
risk factors, and management goals and decisions

•

Operation of the system or project whose risks are being managed

•

Risk management and abatement activities

•

Possible outcomes and their probabilities

•

Impacts on other systems

•

The resulting financial gains or losses.

The model’s adaptability allows users to eliminate facets that are not important for their purposes.
For example, the most general version of the model is based on the viewpoint of the decision
science literature, and views risk as the probability distribution of outcomes, both positive and
negative. An alternative, slightly less general model is presented that reflects the way most of the
IS literature views risk in terms of negative outcomes relative to management goals and
expectations. Omission of positive outcomes from the risk model is only one of many possible
adaptations to meet different analysis needs of different users. A comparison of these two models
with other risk models in the IS literature shows that these two models cover most of the ideas
expressed by previous IS risk models while also providing a practical approach that managers
can use for thinking about IS risk at whatever level of detail makes sense to them.
II. THE NEED FOR MORE CLARITY ABOUT INFORMATION SYSTEM RISK
Our attempt to develop a general, but readily adaptable model of information system risk was
motivated by the results of a survey of the IS risk literature. Attempting to represent the
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reasonably recent literature rather than covering the hundreds of articles directly or indirectly
related to IS risk, our literature survey focused on three journals consistently ranked among the
best IS research journals (MISQ, ISR, and JMIS) and selected articles starting in 1986 whose title
included the word risk or whose abstract focused on risks in system projects or operation. We
supplemented this group of articles with other risk-related articles that we believed were
significant based on our knowledge of the literature. In total we included 46 articles. We believe
these articles are a good representation of the literature. Appendix I categorizes these articles in
terms of
•

definition of risk,

•

model or approach used,

•

type of system or project (which reflects different stages of the software life cycle
and some aspects of the temporal nature of risk), and

•

number and type of risk variables.

The general conclusion from our literature survey is that the IS risk literature is a jumble of
diverse risk models and partially overlapping, atheoretical lists of risk factors and risk
components. This article addresses one shortcoming of the literature, the lack of a practical
model that most managers can use for understanding IS-related risks at whatever level of detail is
appropriate for them. Our companion article [Sherer and Alter, 2004] focuses on risk factors and
delves further into the literature’s coverage of risk components and risk factors.
To introduce ideas needed for a broadly adaptable risk model, this section provides clarifications
related to conceptualizations of risk and different treatments of goals, expectations, and baselines
for assessing risk. It refers to some of the risk models in the IS literature and discusses the
temporal nature of risk.
Before discussing those ideas it is worthwhile to consider criteria that a general, yet broadly
adaptable risk model should satisfy:
•
•

Clarity: The model should be based on clearly defined concepts.
Practicality of use: The model’s use of concepts should be understandable to typical
business professionals. It should provide rigor by organizing a risk analysis, but should
not sacrifice practicality and efficiency for mathematical purity. In particular, it should not
force users to provide data they find unintuitive or untrustworthy.
• Completeness: The model should encompass key issues that business and IT
professionals care about. Omitting issues that users care about will make it less
applicable to the situations in which it is needed.
• Adaptability: The model should be adaptable to the user’s situation and interests. Users
should feel free to include or exclude specific components of the model, but should be
aware of both advantages and disadvantages of such omissions.
Our search of the existing IS risk literature found no risk models that we believe satisfy these four
conditions. We found some models that address the needs of professional software developers,
but none that we believe are truly practical for use by business professionals, complete in the
issues that business professionals care about, and readily adaptable by users who may not be
interested in all of the possible facets of a very general model.
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF RISK
The term risk has various meanings in everyday life. For example, definitions of risk provided by
www.dictionary.com include:
•

The possibility of suffering harm or loss; danger.

•

A factor, thing, element, or course involving uncertain danger; a hazard
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•

For an insurer, the danger or probability of loss or the amount an insurance company
stands to lose.

•

In terms of variability: the variability of returns from an investment or the chance of
nonpayment of a debt.

•

A person or thing as a risk, such as a person considered a poor risk.

The IS risk literature uses several different conceptualizations of risk. Table 1 summarizes the
distribution of risk conceptualizations in the 46 articles selected from the IS risk literature. Most of
these conceptualizations focus on negative occurrences and fall into three categories: (1) risk
components, (2) risk factors, and (3) probability of negative outcomes.
Table 1. Conceptualizations of Risk in 46 IS Risk Articles
Conceptualization of Risk
Risk components: different types of negative outcomes
Risk factors leading to loss or source of risk factors
Risk as probability of negative outcomes (sometimes weighted by loss)
Risk as difficulty in estimating outcome
Risk undefined or discussed using a different term such as problem or threat

Number of articles
11
11
15
2
7

Risk as Risk Components, Different Types of Negative Outcomes
The first conceptualization identifies different types of negative outcomes, such as project risk
(failure to complete a project within budget, schedule and/or quality constraints), functionality risk
(failure to deliver intended functionality), political risk (negative consequences of changing power
relationships with users), or security risk (negative consequences of insecure systems). A
limitation of this conceptualization is that these risk components can often overlap and therefore
are not independent, contrary to what the term component typically means. For example,
functionality risk can be viewed as part of project risk and sometimes can cause political risk and
security risk.
Risk as Factors Leading to Loss
The second conceptualization of risk is as risk factors such as size of project, use of new
software, or malicious employees. Some studies combine risk factors from various sources such
as task, technology, or actors. Others subdivide these sources into finer categories, for example,
specifying a type of actor such as customer or supplier. Our companion article identifies and
organizes 228 risk factors found in the 46 articles in our literature search.
Risk as Probability of Negative Outcomes
Approximately one third of the studies suggest that risk should be measured as a probability
distribution of negative outcomes, often weighted by financial loss. The probabilities of negative
outcomes were subjective estimates or numbers computed based on statistical techniques.
CRITICAL CLARIFICATIONS
We believe that the IS risk literature emphasizes negative outcomes rather than the range of
outcomes approach because it reflects managerial preoccupation with meeting goals. The
emphasis on negative outcomes deserves further comment because the decision analysis
literature typically uses a different definition. We will look at three related aspects of the definition
of risk:
•

Should IS risk focus on negative outcomes?

•

What is the role of goals and expectations in IS risk?

•

What is the baseline for assessing risk?
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Should IS Risk Focus on Negative Outcomes?
In contrast to the emphasis on negative outcomes in the IS risk literature, decision analysts and
operations researchers typically conceptualize risk as a probability distribution of possible
outcomes based on a model that starts with probability distributions for important parameters.
Those probability distributions may be discrete or continuous. For example, discrete probabilities
often appear in decision tree examples related to whether or not to drill for oil based on
parameters of the local geology, whereas continuous distributions may appear in examples
related to complex R&D decisions in pharmaceuticals. In decision trees with discrete probabilities,
the best decision on an expected value basis can be computed at each decision node, providing
a bottom-up method for computing the best decision at the top decision node. For models with
continuous probability distributions, the model’s mathematical relationships generate the results
for each run of a Monte Carlo simulation after a random number generator is used to select a
particular value from the probability distribution for each parameter. Doing multiple runs
generates a probability distribution for indicators such as revenue, profit, and market share.
Those probability distributions can be used to estimate not only expected values, but also
probabilities, such as the probability of making more than $X or losing more than $Y. With either
discrete or continuous formulations it is possible to analyze sensitivity of the results to the
probability estimates and other parameters.
In contrast, the majority of IS professionals do not conceptualize or analyze risk in the way
prescribed by the decision analysis literature. For example, in 2002 the Cutter Consortium [2002]
surveyed IT managers about their organizations' risk management practices. The breakdown of
definitions of risk was:
•

49%: the potential for the realization of unwanted, negative consequences of an event or
situation
• 22%: an uncertain condition or event that involves a negative or positive effect on
achieving some objective
• 22%: any issue or event that may cause deviation from a plan
• 4%: the amount that can afford to be lost
• 2%: the differences between means and ends.
Close to half of the respondents (49%) used what Cutter calls “the traditional definition of risk”, in
which risk connotes negative outcomes, and risk management primarily deals with negative
consequences of some event.
“Nearly the same number (44%) are evenly split between the definition of risk that could
include positive consequences of some event, as well as negative aspects. [Of those]
about half are using the definition of risk that explicitly includes positive or negative
effects, and half define risk as being any deviation from a plan. ...Those organizations
that use formal risk management seem to favor the more traditional definition [i.e., risk
as negative outcomes] over the definitions inclusive of negative and positive effects or
deviation from a plan.” [Cutter Consortium, 2002]
Thus, the asymmetrical “negative outcomes” approach preferred by a slim majority of the Cutter
respondents differs from the symmetrical “range of outcomes” approach in much of the decision
analysis literature.
A 2001 survey of members of risk management SIGs in five professional organizations related to
project and risk management obtained similar results. Describing their organization’s definition of
risk, 54% said it focused exclusively on negative results, 34% said it included both threats and
opportunities, and the remaining 13% cited uncertain events with uncertain effects or “other.” In
the same survey, 54% said that their organizations used risk management processes to manage
threats. That 54% included 26% that used no explicit opportunity management and 28% that
used separate processes for opportunity management and threat management [Roberts and
Kitterman, 2002].

A General, but Readily Adaptable Model of Information Risk by S. Alter and S.A. Sherer

6

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 14, 2004) 1-28

The divergence between the definition of risk used by the decision analysis community and the
definition used by the majority of the IS community raises a quandary related to any purportedly
general model of IS risk. If the model adopts a theoretically pure but unfamiliar, unintuitive, or
impractical definition, its use will be limited. If the model adopts a commonly accepted but
incomplete view, its results may be skewed.
What is the Role of Goals and Expectations in IS Risk?
Few of the risk models in the IS risk literature explicitly consider goals and expectations, even
though goals and expectations play an important role regardless of which conceptualization of
risk is used. Goals and expectations that exist prior to the time interval under consideration
(which might be an accounting period or the duration of a project) are typically the basis for
evaluating success. Outcomes that might be viewed as great successes under one set of goals
and expectations might be viewed as dismal failures under other sets of goals and expectations.
Attending to the goals and expectations that determine which outcomes are positive or negative
is not only important, but essential if risk is viewed in terms of negative outcomes in relation to
goals.
Goals and expectations also affect outcomes directly by setting the aspiration level of work
system participants. Setting the bar higher or lower makes it easier or more difficult to succeed.
Similarly, stretch goals might inspire some people to accomplish more under some circumstances
or might lead to depression under other circumstances.
The mere fact of measuring success against goals and expectations also affects the meaning of
risk factors and success factors and the meaning of their impact on the probabilities of positive
and negative outcomes. Assume, for example, that management expects a project to generate $1
million in benefits and that a risk analysis identifies risk factors A, B, and C whose presence may
make it more difficult to attain that outcome. When setting the goal, management may or may not
have considered the presence of the risk factors, but after announcing the goal, management
probably will be loathe to change it even if additional risk factors are identified that reduce the
probability of success. Compare that situation to a different project whose expected value
determined by a Monte Carlo simulation is $1 million. If the Monte Carlo simulation did not include
relevant risk factors, we would assume that a follow-up simulation including the risk factors would
reduce the expected value. In the first case, the risk factors present an additional challenge to
project personnel but do not change management’s stated goal or expectation; in the other case,
the risk factors affect the expected value (whether or not management would be willing to change
its goals or stated expectations). The first case represents the logic of the negative outcomes
approach for analyzing risk because risk analysis is mostly about identifying and overcoming risks
in order to meet the goal. Regardless of whether management holds firm to a $1 million goal in
the second case, the Monte Carlo simulation will say that the expected value is less than $1
million when the risk factors are considered.
What is the Baseline for Assessing Risk?
Considering both risk factors and success factors in the analysis complicates things further. A risk
analysis should contain both risk factors and success factors if both affect the probability
distribution of outcomes. If a risk analysis is to produce a mathematically calculated distribution
of outcomes, there must be some way to quantify the separate impacts of each risk factor and
success factor, plus any interaction effects that might occur. And even assuming there is a good
theoretical vehicle for computing the impacts, it is not clear how to assess the validity of the
individual impact factors. Regardless of whether they were estimates based on a specific
situation or regression results from a large survey, the numbers themselves would probably be
difficult for most managers to understand and use.
In an even more fundamental sense, if success factors increase the probability of positive
outcomes and risk factors increase the probability of negative outcomes, what is the baseline
from which these effects occur? The two approaches for defining the baseline are:
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1. Managers start from a baseline assumption that none of the success factors and risk
factors is present, and intuitively adjust expectations based on the combined impact of all
the success factors or risk factors that are present.
2. Managers start with an expectation based on their perceptions, experience, and
intuition, and then adjust that expectation based on the presence or absence of each
relevant success factor or risk factor.
Either approach assumes that managers are capable of identifying and combining all relevant
impacts and uncertainties related to the presence or non-presence of relevant success factors
and risk factors. That seems like quite a feat. Human abilities to estimate probabilities of future
events are notoriously poor [Tversky and Kahneman, 1974]. Similar cognitive limits would apply
if managers attempt to make quantitative estimates related to impacts of numerous, partially
interacting success factors and risk factors, especially when there is no reliable way to compute
or describe a real baseline.
APPROACHES USED IN EXISTING RISK MODELS
The literature contains many compilations of risk factors and clusters of risks through Delphi
studies and empirical research [Barki et al., 1993; Bashein et al., 1994; Keil et al., 1998; Doherty
and King, 2001; Jiang et al., 2001; Schmidt et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2001; Jiang et al., 2002;
Scott and Vessey, 2002]. Only a few articles describe explicit models that explain the risk factors
or use the risk factors in a risk management process. Table 2 identifies typical risk models and
their limitations. Most of the models are limited to a subset of IS-related risks and provide limited
guidance for risk management. We will return to these models after presenting our model.
TEMPORAL NATURE OF RISK
System-related risk manifests itself over time. Some risks exist prior to a phase of a system’s life
cycle; others emerge during that phase. Risk management techniques applied during a phase of
the life cycle can lower risks during that phase. The risk at the end of one phase influences risk
in the next phase.
Only 12 of the 46 risk studies in our literature survey specifically address the temporal nature of
risks, and most of those studies focus on software development. This part of the literature
typically has three limitations:
1. Some risk studies focus on specific phases of the software life cycle, without recognizing
that risks in one stage can have an impact on other stages.
2. If the risk model does not include risk management, then the impacts of approaches to
reduce risk are not evaluated. Risk management is an ongoing activity of identifying and
Table 2. Risk Models in the IS Literature
Type of Model

Description

Source

Limitations

Software Risk
Model

Process for risk analysis and
management

[Boehm, 1989;
Charette, 1989;
Higuera and Haimes,
1996; Kontio, 1998]

Limited to software engineering

Contingency
Model

Software development project
performance is influenced by fit
between risk exposure and risk
management

[Barki et al., 2001]

No organizing framework for
risk factors. Does not
distinguish between initial and
emergent risks.

Sociotechnological

Sociotechnical model of
organizational change is used to

[Lyytinen et al., 1996]

Focuses on components
internal to the firm (task,
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model

classify risks by system, project,
and management sources.

structure, actors, and
technology), mainly during a
software project’s development
phase

Options Model

Managing IT investment risk by
choosing options that balance
risk and reward. Considers risks
arising outside the scope of
development

[Benaroch, 2002]

Requires mapping of risks to
specific options; high level of
generality makes it difficult to
use for identifying risks

Performance
Model

Performance risk explains the
effect of coordination and
uncertainty on process control
and product flexibility

[Nidumolu, 1995;
Nidumolu, 1996]

Limited to coordination
mechanisms.

reducing risk. Risk management activities should be included in a realistic model of systemrelated risk because recognition of risk factors encourages appropriate risk reduction
tactics. For example, managers of a project that lacks a crucial skill might bring in an
employee or consultant who has those skills or might change the project so that it does not
require those skills. The available risk reduction tactics depend on the goals and
expectations that apply. For example, a project whose goal is to minimize costs will have
extra difficulty hiring expensive consultants.
3. Even when looking at a particular life cycle phase, most of these studies do not distinguish
between initial and emergent risks. Distinguishing between risks that exist prior to a phase
and those that emerge during a phase is important for risk management because factors
that exist prior to a particular project or operational phase may be managed differently than
those that emerge during that phase. Examples of pre-existing risk factors include major
difficulties with previous projects and lack of knowledge about the technology that will be
used. Examples of emergent risk factors include departure of key personnel during a
project and need to divert resources to other purposes. New risk factors such as these can
emerge due to the past and current operation of the work system or based on inherent
variability, mishaps, and internal and external events that occurred or might occur during
the time interval of interest.
Most of the 12 studies that addressed the temporal nature of risks were drawn from the software
risk literature, which emphasizes the iterative nature of risk assessment and the importance of
risk management. As an example, Table 3 shows the framework proposed by Charette [1989].
Other researchers use similar classifications with slightly varying titles. For example, Boehm
[1989] calls these steps risk assessment (risk identification, risk analysis, risk prioritization) and
risk control (risk management planning, risk resolution, risk monitoring).

Table 3. Risk Management Framework from Software Engineering
Risk Analysis

Risk Management

•

Risk Identification: What can go wrong?

•

•

Risk Measurement: What is the magnitude of
the risk – the expected consequence?
Risk Evaluation: How can risks be prioritized,
and how are the risk measurements related to
acceptable levels of risk?

•

•

•

Risk Planning: Selecting appropriate risk
abatement strategies
Risk Controlling: Implementing the plan’s
control mechanism for risk aversion strategies
Risk Monitoring: Refining actions and providing
feedback
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However, since these models focus only on software development issues, they do not include the
dynamics of risk in the broader realm of projects or systems in general. Software development
models are inadequate for describing, analyzing, or communicating the range of risks that are
relevant to IS projects and IS in operation because many of these risks are business and
organizational risks that are often considered beyond the scope of software development. We
believe that frameworks and models based upon work systems [Alter, 2002; 2003] may be more
useful for analyzing business and operational risks and for communicating with business
customers, users, and other stakeholders who are often important sources of IS risk.
In addition to the software risk studies, Lyytinen and Nidumolu also address the temporal nature
of risks in different phases of IS projects [Nidumolu, 1995; Lyytinen et al., 1996; Nidumolu, 1996;
Lyytinen et al, 1998]. However, they do not explicitly consider emergent risks during a specific
phase of an IS project. Lytinnen’s model suggests that software risks are addressed through
sequential attention shaping and intervention. The risk items are derived from postulated causal
dependencies between risky incidents (events or states in the real world that can cause loss) and
losses. Risk resolution techniques are based on how interventions influence risky incidents.
Major variations in the socio-technical components of a system form risky incidents that increase
the difficulty in estimating a development project’s performance results [Nidumolu, 1995;
Nidumolu, 1996].
ORGANIZATION OF RISK VARIABLES
Appendix I shows that different studies include different risk factors or components. Only a few
studies attempt to organize these variables. Risk variables can apply to information systems in
operation, to projects, or to special types of systems or projects. Many of the risk factors that
apply to information systems in operation also apply to projects and to any work system,
regardless of whether IT is involved. For example, risk factors for any work system include lack of
management support, lack of required knowledge and skill, and lack of required resources. These
risk factors also apply to projects, but some additional risk factors for projects do not apply to
work systems in general, such as inadequate project schedule and inadequate clarity about
project requirements. The organization of risk factors is the subject of our companion article
[Sherer and Alter, 2004].
Even though literally hundreds of risk variables are mentioned in the literature, combining various
lists from various authors does not guarantee that all risks relevant to a particular situation will be
identified. Even sophisticated probabilistic risk assessments used to develop accident scenarios
for complex engineered systems, such as nuclear power plants, suffer from “completeness
uncertainty”, uncertainty about whether all significant phenomena and relationships have been
considered [Vesely and Rasmuson, 1984]. This uncertainty can arise from biases that often cloud
risk identification [Tversky and Kahneman, 1974].
III. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR ANALYZING AND MANAGING RISK
The IS risk literature lacks a broadly accepted model of risk. Such a model would organize risk
factors in a meaningful fashion, recognize that risk is measured against goals, and account for
emergent risks and risk management, and hencethe temporal nature of risk.
Figure 1 presents a risk model that we believe satisfies the four criteria (clarity, practicality of use,
completeness, and adaptability) identified in Section II for a general, yet broadly applicable risk
model. Figure 2 is a reduced version of the more general model in Figure 1. Both are in the
same basic form, except that the first model uses a “range of outcomes” approach to risk,
whereas the second model uses a “negative outcomes” approach and is therefore not quite as
general. In both models, system-related risk is about risks for work performed during a time
interval. This work may be an entire project, a phase in a project (such as development or
implementation), or the operation of a work system during the time interval in question. Risk is
fundamentally about uncertainty in work performance and the resulting outcomes. Presenting
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Sources of Uncertainty
Inherent Variability
Mishaps
Internal events
External events

Contingency Management:
- Identify Contingencies
- Evaluate Contingencies
- Respond

Initial and Emergent
Risk and Success
Factors

W ork system being analyzed

Goals and
Expectations

Impacts on
other systems
and projects

Range of Outcomes
and their Probabilities

Financial
results

Figure 1. Model for Analyzing and Managing Contingencies Based on a “Range of Outcomes”
Approach to Risk

Sources of Uncertainty
Inherent Variability
Mishaps
Internal events
External events

Risk Management:
- Identify Risks
- Evaluate Risks
- Respond

Initial and Emergent
Risk Factors

W ork system being analyzed

Goals and
Expectations

Impacts on
other systems
and projects

Negative
Outcomes

Financial
Loss

Figure 2. Model for Analyzing and Managing Risks Based on a Negative Outcomes Approach to
Risk
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both models reflects the distinction between the two approaches to risk and provides users a
choice of which approach they prefer. The “range of outcomes” model is more general; the
“negative outcomes” model is similar in flow but different in detail. Both models were designed to
support further adaptation and simplification in the sense of allowing users to address or ignore
specific parts of the models, and to be clear about which issues they are including or excluding.
Both models attempt to satisfy a number of goals:
•

Representing risk and risk management in a much more comprehensive way than is
possible with numerous, largely unrelated treatments of risk and risk factors as lengthy
lists of things that could go wrong or of factors that might be correlated to negative
outcomes
• Demonstrating that either version of a single risk model can cover a broad range of
relevant situations
• Providing useful guidance without forcing the user to adopt a particular stance concerning
the collection and use of specific quantitative or qualitative data
Either version of the model should be meaningful to potential users. For example, a general
manager could use it to support risk management for an operational information system.
Similarly, a software development team could use it to help organize a quantitative risk analysis
based on years of data collected from a CMM (Capability Maturity Model) level 5 programming
group.
Both versions of the model apply to work systems in general, as well as special cases of work
systems such as information systems, projects, and more specialized cases such as ERP
systems and reengineering projects.1 Using the work system framework (rather than a
representation of a software project, for example) as a central building block implies that the idea
of risk management in relation to expectations and sources of uncertainty is not just about the
technical work of IT professionals. The same general logic applies to risk management for almost
any work system of significance.
The graphical representations in both figures illustrate relationships between facets of the model
including:
•

goals and expectations,

•

risk factors and other sources of uncertainty,

•

the operation of the work system whose risks are being managed,

•

the risk management (contingency management) effort,

•

the possible outcomes and their probabilities,

•

the impacts on other systems,

•

the resulting financial gains or losses.

1

A work system is a system in which human participants and/or machines perform work using information,
technology, and other resources to produce products and/or services for internal or external customers
[Alter, 2003]. A work system is a general case of systems operating within or across organizations. An
information system is a work system whose work practices are devoted to processing information or data.
Similarly, a project is a work system designed to produce a particular product and then go out of existence.

The triangular icon that appears three times in Figure 1 and in Figure 2 stands for the work
system framework, a graphical representation of the nine elements included in even a
rudimentary understanding of a work system. The nine elements include work practices,
participants, information, technologies, products and services produced, customers, environment,
infrastructure, and strategy.
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The facets and relationships between them will be discussed individually, starting with the work
system whose risks are being managed. For the sake of simplicity, the discussion of each facet
will refer to the more general “range of outcomes” model in Figure 1. Later, after discussing the
facets shared by the two models, we will return to the relative advantages and disadvantages of
each model.
FACETS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
Work System Whose Risks are Being Managed
At the heart of the model in Figure 1 is a work system whose risks are being managed. The
specific work system under consideration might be a work system supported by one or more
information systems, or might be a specific information system, project, or supply chain that
crosses organizational boundaries. (All of these are special cases of work systems.) It also might
be a special case of any of them, such as a software development project or ERP implementation
project. The reason for placing the work system framework at the model’s core is that the same
logic concerning sources of uncertainty, risk management, and outcomes applies for work
systems in general, information systems, projects, and all special cases. The only difference is
that the risk factors and other specifics may differ depending on the special case being
considered.
Goals and Expectations
The model in Figure 1 starts with goals and expectations. The three arrows emanating from
“goals and expectations” represent
•
•
•

the impact of expectations and goals on the relevant risk factors and sources of
uncertainty,
the impact of goals and expectations on the level of aspiration by work system
participants including managers, and
the role of goals and expectations in evaluation of the outcomes after the time interval of
interest.

Sources of Uncertainty
In addition to any relevant risk factors and success factors, the sources of uncertainty considered
in risk management should include inherent variability in the situation, mishaps, internal events,
and external events. Some risk factors and other sources of uncertainty (such as inherent
variability) exist and can be recognized before the time interval of interest. Additional risk factors,
success factors, and other sources of uncertainty (such as personnel turnover, mishaps, and
organizational chaos) may emerge during the time interval. Regardless of when specific sources
of uncertainty become evident, the goal of risk management is to understand and contain the
uncertainties to assure that goals and expectations are satisfied. The double arrows between the
work system in operation and the sources of uncertainty indicate that the uncertainties affect the
operation of the work system and vice versa. For example, the risk factor inadequate expertise
might cause significant delays. In turn, those delays could then cause additional uncertainties due
to insufficient time to complete the work carefully.
Risk Management (Contingency Management)
The model in Figure 1 uses the term contingency management rather than risk management
because a range of outcomes model places substantial emphasis on both positive and negative
occurrences. Although contingency management may start with an initial risk identification and
evaluation, it is assumed to continue throughout the time interval under consideration. The arrow
from sources of uncertainty to contingency management says that contingency management
decisions will respond to changes in the sources of uncertainty. The double arrows between
contingency management and work system being analyzed indicate that contingency
management affects the work system and vice versa. For example, extra control measures
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introduced to reduce uncertainties due to inadequate expertise might absorb a lot of participant
time, thereby potentially affecting measures of performance related to efficiency. To maintain the
desired level of efficiency, managers and other work system participants might create temporary
accommodations such as shifting work assignments in a way that maintains the desired rate of
progress.
Other Work Systems
Information systems, projects, and other work systems never exist in isolation. Instead, they
affect and are affected by other work systems. The arrow from work system being analyzed to
“impacts on other systems and projects” says that positive and negative outcomes are not just
direct outcomes about the work system under consideration, but may also include outcomes
related to impacts on other systems and projects.
Range of Outcomes and Their Probabilities
The range of possibilities includes both disappointments and positive surprises that occur relative
to the original goals and expectations. Some of the outcomes may occur during the time interval
under consideration, but the totality of outcomes is evaluated after the end of the time interval.
Financial Results
Financial results are the probability distributions of outcomes, both positive and negative,
expressed in monetary terms.
THE ALTERNATIVE MODEL
The alternative model in Figure 2 conceptualizes risk in terms of negative outcomes rather than
the range of outcomes and related probabilities. The general form is the same as the more
general model in Figure 1, but a number of the terms are different.
•

Instead of risk and success factors, it only mentions risk factors.

•

Instead of contingency management, it only mentions risk management.

•

Instead of range of outcomes and their probabilities, it only mentions
negative outcomes

•

Instead of financial outcomes, it mentions financial loss.

By conceptualizing risk in terms of negative outcomes, the risk model in Figure 2 is consistent
with the view of IS risk management used by the majority of organizations and by much of the IS
risk literature. Based on these results from practice and from the IS literature, we believe that use
of a negative outcomes approach is consistent with the way most managers think about risk
related to information systems in operation and IS projects. Although the range of outcomes
approach is more general and complete, we believe it has relatively little utility in most IS risk
analysis because so much of the management attention in the area focuses on reducing the
probability of negative outcomes relative to goals and expectations.
Another reason for adopting the negative outcomes approach is that it simplifies the entire
discussion and makes management engagement more practical. If the baseline is simply a goal
to be reached, risk factors need to be identified and prioritized in order to manage risks, but it is
possible to skip much of the complexity related to the meaning of a mathematically computed
expected value. It may be possible to quantify the risks and impacts in certain highly experienced
and sophisticated software development organizations in stable environments, but such situations
are rare. In typical business situations, the relevant historical data does not exist, and variability
from year to year and system to system is large due to competitive forces, internal politics, and
contingencies related to specific information systems.

A General, but Readily Adaptable Model of Information Risk by S. Alter and S.A. Sherer

14

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 14, 2004) 1-28

OTHER ADAPTATIONS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
The idea of alternative models can be extended further by looking at the various facets of the
models in Figures 1 and 2 and asking whether some of those facets might be eliminated or
simplified to tailor the model to the user’s knowledge and situation-specific needs without
destroying its potential usefulness. We call this model characteristic adaptability.
Designing a risk model so that certain facets can be eliminated is consistent with the idea that
genuinely useful models should be tailored to the situation users encounter. For example, a
model that requires continuous probability distributions will not be used effectively in situations
when there is no agreement about those distributions or when the potential users lack the training
necessary to understand what probability distributions mean. Similarly, models that focus on
initial conditions and ignore management actions during the time interval under consideration will
be less realistic than models that consider those management actions. Table 4 identifies
ramifications of eliminating or ignoring various facets of the general risk model that was shown in
Figure 1.

Table 4. Implications of Eliminating or Ignoring Various Facets of the General Risk Model
in Figure 1
Facet of the
General Model

Implications of Eliminating or Ignoring this Facet

Definition of risk

The definition of risk cannot be eliminated without making the model hard to
understand.

Goals and
expectations

Possible adaptation: Eliminate goals and expectations from the model because the
user wants to focus on the range of outcomes.
Ramifications: Eliminating explicit inclusion of goals and expectations would make
it impossible to use a negative outcomes approach because there would be no
basis for evaluating the results. Eliminating goals and expectations would have
other ramifications:
… It might bring into question the meaning or intensity of some of the risk or
success factors by eliminating a baseline for comparison.

… It might assume unrealistic behavior by managers, who typically pay a lot of
attention to goals and expectations.
Success factors

Possible adaptation: Eliminate success factors from the model
Ramifications: Eliminating the success factors might skew the analysis by
consciously ignoring factors that mitigate risks and that might lead to more positive
results.

Risk factors

Possible adaptation: Eliminate risk factors from the model
Ramifications: Risk factors can be built into the underlying assumptions and not
mentioned explicitly in the analysis. It seems likely that treating risk factors as
implicit will reduce their visibility and might lead to overlooking important issues.

Other sources of
uncertainty

Possible adaptation: Eliminate other sources of uncertainty. Just consider risk
factors in the negative outcomes approach or risk factors and success factors in
the range of outcomes approach.
Ramifications: If the user believes that risk factors and success factors should
encompass all known sources of uncertainty, then the use of risk factors and
success factors would suffice. If the user believes the opposite, eliminating other
sources of uncertainty from the analysis would be acceptable only if these were
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Implications of Eliminating or Ignoring this Facet
relatively inconsequential.

Initial risk factors

Possible adaptation: Eliminate initial risk factors because the risk analysis will start
after the project has begun.
Ramifications: It is hard to imagine how a risk analysis for an information system or
IS project could be done without considering initial risk factors. Also, it seems
unlikely anyone would want to start risk analysis after a project begins. Even if that
happened and emergent risk factors appeared, many of the initial risk factors
would probably still be in force.

Emergent risks

Possible adaptation: Eliminate emergent risk factors by performing the entire risk
analysis must occur before the project begins.
Ramifications: For some model users such as managers involved in making
investment decisions, performing a complete risk analysis before the project begins
can make sense because someone else will do the subsequent analysis after the
project is underway.

Type of work system

Possible adaptation: Ignore the type of work system.
Ramifications: Risk factors and success factors for work systems in general
provide a useful first cut at the relevant risk factors and success factors for most
specific systems, but it is hard to imagine why one would want to ignore risk and
success factors associated with a specific system type when doing a risk analysis.

Risk management

Possible adaptation: Eliminate risk management from the model because the
analysis looks at the effect of risk factors and/or success factors and assumes risk
management will happen on an all things being equal basis.
Ramifications: A straightforward a priori risk analysis supporting an investment
decision might take this approach. Eliminating risk management from the model
would not make sense, however, if the analysis were meant to cover an ongoing
project.

Impacts on other
systems

Possible adaptation: Eliminate consideration of impacts on other systems because
that would make the analysis too broad.
Ramifications: Simplifies the analysis by reducing the scope of the positive and/or
negative outcomes considered in the analysis. Ignoring potentially relevant
outcomes may change the results of the analysis.

Full range of
outcomes

Possible adaptation: Follow some version of the model in Figure 2 and consider
only negative outcomes.
Ramifications: Give little or no weight to outcomes that exceed expectations in a
positive direction.

Inclusion of
probabilities

Possible adaptation: Exclude probabilities of events or parameter values because
the probabilities cannot be estimated reliably or because disagreements about the
probabilities are large.
Ramifications: Excluding probabilities makes it impossible to compute expected
values and restricts the types of quantitative results that a risk analysis can
produce.

Range of financial
results

Possible adaptation: Do not determine financial results. Just focus on positive
and/or negative outcomes and actions to make the positive outcomes more likely
and the negative outcomes less likely.
Ramifications: The analysis cannot produce a probability distribution of financial
outcomes, but can still help in identifying hazards and in supporting risk
management.
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COMPARISON WITH OTHER MODELS IN THE LITERATURE
Table 2 listed five risk models in the literature. The foregoing discussion of the model we propose
demonstrates that our model covers a number of topics not included in the other models. Table 5
lists topics in our model and indicates whether those topics are or are not included explicitly in the
models in Table 2. Table 5 is not meant as a criticism of the previous models because each of
those models was designed for a particular purpose and served that purpose.
In contrast to the previous models, our risk model is more complete, adaptable, and practical for
use by business managers. For example, the software risk model includes most aspects of our
negative outcomes model but focuses only on software development through the point when the
software meets requirements rather than when the software is used successfully as part of a new
or improved work system. Our model is more useful for business managers who are concerned
with managing all risks related to whatever work system is being analyzed. In contrast, Table 5
says that the contingency model, the socio-technological model, and the performance model do
not explicitly consider emerging sources of uncertainty, nor do they attempt to quantify loss.
These three models focus on different relationships, first between risk management and
exposure, second among firm-specific factors and potential loss, and third, between uncertainty
and performance. While the models are all useful to business managers, each of them is limited
to a particular aspect of risk analysis. The options model addresses investment risk across a
sequence of choices. It includes positive and negative financial outcomes but does not identify
other sources of uncertainty in addition to specific competitive, market, and firm specific risks.
Most of the models implicitly assume specific goals but provide no guidelines for measuring the
impact of goals on risk.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This article attempted to advance the discussion of system-related risks by demonstrating steps
toward better models for managing risk. It began by discussing issues related to
conceptualizations of risk, the importance of goals and expectations, approaches used by
different risk models, the temporal nature of risk, and the organization of risk variables. It
discussed why a broadly applicable model for understanding and analyzing system- and projectrelated risks should define risk clearly and should include:
Table 5. Inclusion or Non-inclusion of Facets of Our Model in Previous Models
Degree of Inclusion in the Previous Models
Topic in our
model

Software Risk
Model

Contingency
Model

Socio-technical model

Options
Model

Performance
Model

Goals and
expectations

Implicit

Includes
performance
criteria

Investment
goals

Not explicit

Risk factors

Included

Includes
competitive
and market
risks in addition
to firm specific
risks

Requirements
uncertainty and
technological
uncertainty

Success
factors

Not included –
focuses on
negative
outcomes

Included
(technological
newness,
application
size, expertise,
application
complexity,
organizational
environment)
Risk
management
only

Stakeholder
expectations
recognized; no
explicit
development
Includes
factors and
their
interactions
(actors,
structure,
technology,
task,
environment)
Not included

Implicitly
included in
NPV analysis
of options

Not included
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Other sources
of uncertainty
Temporal
relationships

Included

Not included

Included with
spiral model

Scores in
different stages
of life cycle

Risk
management

Explicitly
included

Work system
affected by
changes
Impacts on
other systems
Outcomes

Software
development

Financial
results
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Not explicitly
included
Includes risk
management
impact

Not explicit

Not included

Explicitly
included

Includes
internal
integration,
formal
planning, and
user
participation
IS project

Explicitly
included

Included
through choice
of options

Not explicit;
mutual
adjustments
over time
Vertical and
horizontal
coordination

IS project

IS projects and
IS in operation

IS projects

Included

Not included

Not explicit

Included

Not included

Negative

System quality;
cost gap

Negative

Positive and
negative

Expected loss

Impact of
potential loss
(measured on
a Likert scale)

Not computed

Included

Positive
(process and
product
performance)
and negative
(overruns)
Not included;
project
performance
(process,
product,
overruns)

•

risk factors and other sources of uncertainty,

•

the temporal nature of risks,

•

a clear baseline for characterizing and evaluating outcomes,

•

explicit recognition of risk management activities.

It presented a new, highly adaptable risk analysis model based on those ideas, and for
comparison showed an alternative model based on a different conceptualization of risk.
The discussion of topics needed in a risk management model and the presentation of alternative
versions of the new risk model lead to conclusions concerning:
•

the model’s potential value as a step toward understanding system- and project- risk

•

the impact of goals and expectations

•

relative value of the negative outcomes versus range of outcomes approaches

•

use of the work system framework in risk analysis

•

potential value of tracing risk management activities.

We will discuss each topic in turn.
The Model’s Potential Value as a Step Toward Understanding System and Project Risk
The alternative models for analyzing and managing system- and project risk in organizations
(Figures 1 and 2) illustrate shortcomings of the existing IS risk literature, which relies too much on
lists of risk factors and not enough on the dynamics of system-related risk. The models define risk
and include risk factors and other sources of uncertainty, goals and expectations, the temporal
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sequence, and risk management activities. They apply to work systems in general, as well as
information systems, projects, and more specialized cases. They can be used to motivate and
organize further exploration of the IS risk literature, including comparison of the issues
emphasized in different parts of the literature, but there is greater potential value in developing
practical risk management tools.
A possible next step would involve using this model to develop risk diagnostics and tools for
improving risk management. Use of the diagnostics in any particular situation would combine
relevant risks and risk factors for work systems in general plus additional risks and risk factors
associated with the specific type of situation that is being managed. In developing practical risk
diagnostics it would be important to verify that those diagnostics fit comfortably into risk
management processes that are practical for the types of managers in the relevant situations.
Impact of Goals and Expectations
Everyday life teaches us that goals and expectations affect action. Research has shown that
individuals’ risk propensity affects their behaviors on software projects [Keil et al, 2000; Smith et
al, 2001]. Goals and expectations also affect risk management in a variety of ways including
determining the level of aspiration in doing work, creating goal-related risk factors (e.g., the risk
factor of low aspirations due to slack goals vs. the risk factor of depression and cynicism due to
impossible goals), and forming the basis of evaluating the results. The effects of goals and
expectations on a series of issues deserve additional research:
First, is there any evidence that the degree of slack or over-reach in goals and expectations
affects the way risk is conceived and managed in real situations?
Second, which risk factors and risks seem to be dependent on goals rather than other aspects of
the situation?
Third, to what extent is the high failure rate of IS projects a result of how high the bar is set rather
than a result of other factors ostensibly being studied?
Negative Outcomes Versus Range of Outcomes
We identified two possible conceptualizations of risk that could be used in a risk management
model. The range of outcomes approach considers both positive and negative outcomes,
whereas the negative outcomes approach focuses on foreseeable things that can go wrong, in
some cases including the severity and probability of each negative occurrence. Most of the IS
risk literature uses the latter conceptualization. In contrast, the decision science literature typically
gives equal weight to positive and negative occurrences and is concerned about the distribution
of outcomes around an expected value, rather than just meeting management goals and
expectations.
Our most general risk model is based on the “range of outcomes”
conceptualization of risk, but we argued that it did not seem as useful or practical for IS risk
management as the model that conceptualized risk as negative outcomes. We recognize that the
“real options” planning technique of economics uses the range of outcomes, but is about
sequences of investment decisions rather than risk management for projects or operational
systems. The impacts of using one approach or the other in analyzing system or project risk in
practice should be studied. The inclusion of contingency management also raises numerous
questions about how managers perceive risks, risk factors, success, and success factors, and
what types of alternatives they pursue under what circumstances. For example, how useful are
current taxonomies of how managers perceive risk and success, and of the types of risk reduction
and success assurance tactics they use? Taxonomies of these types should help in developing
the next level of the model.
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Use of the Work System Framework in Risk Analysis
We believe that using work systems as a central concept overcomes some of the limitations of
previous IS risk models that focus on specific aspects of the development process (e.g. software
engineering) or system usage (e.g. coordination mechanisms). The use of the work system
framework in the risk models in Figures 1 and 2 serves a number of purposes that are described
in more detail in the companion article [Sherer and Alter, 2004].
Because many of our
arguments favor using work systems as a basic concept, it would be worth examining contrary
arguments that using the concept of work system as a common denominator is undesirable
because it generates less focused analysis or for other reasons.
Tracing Risk Management Activities
The risk models in Figures 1 and 2 summarize a general logic of risk management based on a
combination of goals and expectations, initial and emergent risk factors, other sources of
uncertainty, the operation of the work system being analyzed, and the management actions
related to risk abatement. An important next step is to trace how risk management activities
actually occur in different types of situations. For example, what topics do managers discuss; to
what extent do they actually consider risk factors; what is the relative balance of discussions of
the work system being supported versus discussions of the information or project that is
attempting to support the work system? In addition to testing the validity of the new risk model,
tracing how risk management actually occurs might reveal directions for improving the model and
for creating tools that could help managers reduce impacts of risks they face.
REFERENCES
Alter, S. (2002). “The Work System Method for Understanding Information Systems and
Information Systems Research.” Communications of the AIS (9)6, pp. 90-104.
Alter, S. (2003). “18 Reasons Why IT-Reliant Work Systems Should Replace 'the IT Artifact' as
the Core of the IS Field.” Communications of the AIS (12)23. pp. 365-394.
Austin, R. (2001). “The Effects of Time Pressure on Quality in Software Development:
Agency Model.” Information Systems Research (12)23, pp. 195-207.

An

Barki, H., S. Rivard and J. Talbot (1993). “Toward an Assessment of Software Development
Risk.” Journal of Management Information Systems (10)2, pp. 203-225.
Barki, H., S. Rivard and J. Talbot (2001). “An Integrative Contingency Model of Software Project
Risk Management.” Journal of Management Information Systems (17)4, pp. 37 (33 pgs).
Bashein, B., L. Markus and P. Riley (1994). “Preconditions for BPR Success and How to Prevent
Failures.” Information Systems Management (11)2, pp. 7-13.
Baskerville, R. and J. Stage (1996). “Controlling Prototype Development through Risk Analysis.”
MIS Quarterly (20)4, pp. 481-504.
Benaroch, M. (2002). “Managing Information Technology Investment Risk: A Real Options
Perspective.” Journal of Management Information Systems (19)2, pp. 43-84.
Boehm, B. (1988). “A Spiral Model of Software Development and Enhancement.” IEEE
Computer, pp. 61-72.
Boehm, B. (1989). Software Risk Management. Washington DC: IEEE Computer Society Press.
Boehm, B. and R. Ross (1989). “Theory-W Software Project Management:
Examples.” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, pp. 902-917.

Principles and

Chan, S. (2001). “Risky E-Business.” Internal Auditor, pp. 62-63.
Charette, R. (1989). Software Engineering Risk Analysis and Management. New York: McGraw
Hill.

A General, but Readily Adaptable Model of Information Risk by S. Alter and S.A. Sherer

20

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 14, 2004) 1-28

Clemons, E. K. (1991). “Evaluation of Strategic Investments in Information Technology.”
Communications of the ACM (34)1, pp. 23-36.
Clemons, E. K. (1995). “Using Scenario Analysis to Manage the Strategic Risks of
Reengineering.” Sloan Management Review, pp. 61-71.
Clemons, E. K., M. E. Thatcher and M. Row (1995). “Identifying Sources of Reengineering
Failures: A Study of the Behavioral Factors Contributing to Reengineering Risks.”
Journal of Management Information Systems (12)2, pp. 9-36.
Cutter Consortium (2002) "Exactly What is Risk Management?" Cutter Consortium Press Room,
June 6, 2002. Accessed on March 23, 2004 at http://www.cutter.com/press/020606.html
Doherty, N. and M. King (2001). “An Investigation of the Factors Affecting the Successful
Treatment of Organisational Issues in Systems Development Projects.” European Journal
of Information Systems (10), pp. 147-160.
Gogan, J., J. Fedorowicz and A. Rao (1999). “Assessing Risks in Two Projects: A Strategic
Opportunity and a Necessary Evil.” Communications of the AIS (1)15.
Grover, V., S. R. Jeong, W. Kettinger and J. Teng (1995). “The Implementation of Business
Process Reengineering.” Journal of Management Information Systems (12)1, pp. 109144.
Higuera, R. and Y. Haimes (1996). Software Risk Management. Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon,
Software Engineering Institute, Report SEI/CMU-96-TR-012.
Jiang, J., G. Klein and R. Discenza (2001). “Information System Success as Impacted by Risks
and Development Strategies.” IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management (48)1, pp.
46-55.
Jiang, J., G. Klein and T. S. Ellis (2002). “A Measure of Software Development Risk.” Project
Management Journal (33)3, pp. 30-41.
Jones, C. (1994). Assessment and Control of Software Risks. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Keil, M., P. Cule, K. Lyytinen and R. Schmidt (1998). “A Framework for Identifying Software
Project Risks.” Communications of the ACM (41)11, pp. 76-83.
Keil, M., B. Tan, K.-K. Wei and T. Saarinen (2000). “A Cross Cultural Study on Escalation of
Commitment Behavior in Software Projects.” MIS Quarterly (24)2, pp. 299-325.
Kemerer, C. F. and G. I. Sosa (1991). “Systems Development Risks in Strategic Information
Systems.” Information and Software Technology (33)3, pp. 212-223.
Kontio, J., G. Getto, and D. Landes (1998). Experiences in Improving Risk Processes Using the
Concepts of the Riskit Method. SIGSOFT'98, Sixth International Symposium on the
Foundations of Software Engineering.
Kumar, K. and E. Christiaanse (1999). From Static Supply Chains to Dynamic Supply Webs:
Principles for Radical Redesign in the Age of Information. Proceedings of the 1999
International Conference on Information Systems, December.
Kumar, K. and H. Dissel (1996). “Sustainable Collaboration: Managing Conflict and Cooperation
in Interorganizational Information Systems.” MIS Quarterly, pp. 279-300.
Lee, H. G. and T. Clark (1997). “Market Process Reengineering through Electronic Market
Systems: Opportunities and Challenges.” Journal of Management Information Systems
(13)3, pp. 113-136.
Loch, K., H. Carr and M. Warkentin (1992). “Threats to Information Systems: Today's Reality,
Yesterday's Understanding.” MIS Quarterly (16)2, pp. 173-186.
Lyytinen, K., L. Mathiassen and J. Ropponen (1996). “A Framework for Software Risk
Management.” Journal of Information Technology (11), pp. 275-285.

A General, but Readily Adaptable Model of Information Risk by S. Alter and S.A. Sherer

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume14, 2004) 1-28

21

Lyytinen, K., L. Mathiassen and J. Ropponen (1998). “Attention Shaping and Software Risk - a
Categorical Analysis of Four Classical Risk Management Approaches.” Information
Systems Research (9)3, pp. 233-255.
McComb, D. and J. Y. Smith (1991). “System Project Failure: The Heuristics of Risk.” Journal of
Information Systems (8)1, pp. 25-34.
McFarlan, W. (1981). “Portfolio Approach to Information Systems.” Harvard Business Review, pp.
142-150.
Mohan, L., W. Holstein and R. Adams (1990). “EIS: It Can Work in the Public Sector.” MIS
Quarterly, pp. 435-448.
Moynihan, T. (2002). “Coping with Client-Based "People Problems": The Theories of Action of
Experienced IS/Software Project Management.” Information and Management (39), pp.
377-390.
Nidumolu, S. (1995). “The Effect of Coordination and Uncertainty on Software Project
Performance: Residual Performance Risk as an Intervening Variable.” Information
Systems Research (6)3, pp. 191-219.
Nidumolu, S. (1996). “A Comparison of Structural Contingency and Risk-Based Perspectives on
Coordination in Software Development Projects.” Journal of Management Information
Systems (13)2, pp. 77-113.
Rainer, R., C. Snyder and H. Carr (1991). “Risk Analysis for Information Technology.” Journal of
Management Information Systems (8)1, pp. 129-147.
Rainer, R. K. and H. Watson (1995). “The Keys to Executive Information Systems Success.”
Journal of Management Information Systems (12)2, pp. 83-98.
Richmond, W. B. and A. Seidmann (1993). “Software Development Outsourcing Contract:
Structure and Business Value.” Journal of Management Information Systems (10)1, pp.
57.
Roberts, B. and R. Kitterman (2002) "Risk Management Working Group" INCOSE Insight: A
Publication of the International Council on Systems Engineering, (5)1, April, pp. 31-33.
Accessed on Mar. 23, 2004 at http://www.incose.org/insight-archive/posted/vol-5-issue1.pdf
Rockart, J. F. and A. D. Crescenzi (1984). “Engaging Top Management in Information
Technology.” Sloan Management Review, pp. 3-16.
Schmidt, R., K. Lyytinen, M. Keil and P. Cule (2001). “Identifying Software Project Risks: An
International Delphi Study.” Journal of Management Information Systems (17)4, pp. 5-36.
Scott, J. and I. Vessey (2002). “Managing Risks in Enterprise Systems.” Communications of the
ACM (45)4, pp. 74-81.
Sherer, S. (1992). Software Failure Risk: Measurement and Management. New York: Plenum
Press.
Sherer, S. A., M. Ray and N. Chowdhury (2002). Assessing Information Technology Investments
with an Integrative Process Framework. Proceedings of 35th International Conference on
System Sciences, Hawaii.
Sherer, S.A. and S. Alter (2004). "Information Systems Risks and Risk Factors: Are they Mostly
about Information Systems?" Communications of AIS (14)2, pp. 29-62
Smith, H., J. McKeen and D. S. Staples (2001). “Risk Management in Information Systems:
Problems and Pitfalls.” Communications of the AIS (7)13.
Straub, D. and R. Welke (1998). “Coping with Systems Risk: Security Planning Models for
Management Decision Making.” MIS Quarterly, pp. 441-469.

A General, but Readily Adaptable Model of Information Risk by S. Alter and S.A. Sherer

22

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 14, 2004) 1-28

Tversky, A. and A. Kahneman (1974). “Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.”
Science (185), pp. 1124-1131.
Vesely, W. E. and D. M. Rasmuson (1984). “Uncertainties in Nuclear Probabilistic Risk Analyses.”
Risk Analysis (4)4, pp. 312-322.
Viehland, D. (2002). “"Risk E-Business": Assessing Risk in Electronic Commerce.” Decision Line.
Vitale, M. (1986). “The Growing Risks of Information Systems Success.” MIS Quarterly (10)4, pp.
327-336.
Yourstone, S. and H. Smith (2002). “Managing System Errors and Failures in Health Care
Organizations: Suggestions for Practice and Research.” Health Care Management
Review (27)1, pp. 50-61.

APPENDIX I: A SAMPLE OF THE IS RISK LITERATURE
Source

# of
varia
bles

[Austin, 2001]

Risk Variables

Model /Approach

Risk
Definition

Type of
System or
Project

Shortcuts

Model to analyze the
effects of time pressure
on quality

Component

Software
projects

[Barki et al., 1993]

35

Technological
newness, application
size, lack of
expertise, application
complexity,
organizational
environment

Survey

Project
uncertainty X
Magnitude of
potential loss

IS project

[Barki et al., 2001]

23

Technological
newness, application
size, lack of
expertise, application
complexity,
organizational
environment

Software development
project performance is
influenced by fit
between risk exposure
and risk management

Project
uncertainty X
Magnitude of
potential loss

IS project

[Bashein et al.,
1994]

3

Lack of sustained
management
commitment,
unrealistic scope and
expectations,
resistance to change

Survey of BPR
consultants

Not defined

BPR
projects

[Baskerville and
Stage, 1996]

28

Developers, users,
application domain,
problem domain,
computer system,
development
environment

Explicit risk
management enables
risk resolution strategies
to be put in place before
prototyping.

Severity and
probability

IS
prototyping
project

[Benaroch, 2002]

3

Firm specific risks,
competitive risks,
market risks

Managing IT investment
risk by choosing options
that balance risk and

Components

IS projects
and IS in
operation
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Temporal
Variables

Scores in
different
stages of life
cycle

Iterative with
prototypes
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23

reward
[Boehm, 1989]

10

Personnel shortfalls,
unrealistic schedules
and budgets,
continuous stream of
requirements
changes, shortfalls in
components, task,
straining capabilities

Project management
theory to make
everyone a winner

Probability
times loss

Software
project

Risk
analysis
followed by
risk management; spiral
model

Model with steps for risk
assessment
(identification, analysis,
prioritization) and risk
control (management
planning, resolution,
and monitoring)

Probability
times loss

Software
project

Risk
analysis
followed by
risk management

Personnel shortfalls,
unrealistic schedules
and budgets,
continuous stream of
requirements
changes, shortfalls in
components, task,
straining capabilities

Software process model

Probability
times loss

Software
project

Spiral model

Credit, market,
liquidity, insurance,
operational,
reputational,
strategic, competitive,
regulatory, systemic

Risk framework

Components

E-business
operation

Approach to software
engineering analysis
and management

Probability
times loss

Software
project

[Boehm and Ross,
1989]

[Boehm, 1988]

10

[Chan, 2001]

[Charette, 1989]

[Clemons, 1995]

2

Functionality risk,
political risk

Scenario analysis to
manage risks of
reengineering

Risk
Components

Reengineering Project

[Clemons et al.,
1995]

5

Political risk, financial
risk, technical risk,
functionality risk,
project risk

Identifying
reengineering risks

Risk
components

Reengineering project

[Clemons, 1991]

5

Financial risk,
technical risk,
functionality risk,
project risk, systemic
risk

Balance and manage
different risks

Risk
components

Strategic
info
systems
project

[Doherty and King,
2001]

2

Organizational,
technical

Survey identifying
treatment of
organizational vs.
technical issues

Organization-al
issues, not risk

IS project

[Gogan et al., 1999]

5

Time constraints,
system
interdependence,
project size, project

Adds two new variables
to McFarlan’s model;
case studies

Likelihood and
consequence

IS project
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Risk
analysis
followed by
management

Project
phases

24
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structure, technology
familiarity
[Grover et al.,
1995]

Management support,
technology
competence, process
delineation, project
planning, change
management, project
management

Identification and
severity of problems

Not defined as
risk; problems

Reengineering

[Higuera and
Haimes, 1996]

64

Software risk
taxonomy by class,
element, and attribute

Software risk taxonomy

Probability
times
consequence

Software
project

[Jiang et al., 2001]

34

Technological
acquisition,
application size, lack
of team’s application
expertise, lack of user
support, lack of clarity
of role definitions,
lack of user
experience

Instrument to measure
software development
risk

Risk factors

IS project

[Jiang et al., 2002]

34

Technological
acquisition,
application size, lack
of team’s application
expertise, lack of user
support, lack of clarity
of role definitions,
lack of user
experience

Risk reduction
strategies involving
behavioral aspects are
more influential in risk
reduction than those
aimed at technical risks.

Risk factors

IS project

[Jones, 1994]

63

See contents

For each factor,
provides information on
severity scales,
frequency, occurrence
susceptibility and
resistance, root causes

Risk Factors

Software
project

[Keil et al., 1998]

11

Lack of top mgt
commitment, failure
to gain user
commitment,
misunderstanding
requirements, lack of
adequate user
involvement, failure to
manage end user
expectations,
changing
scope/objectives, lack
of required
knowledge/skills, lack
of frozen
requirements,
introduction of new
technology,
insufficient staffing,
conflict between user

Risk categorization
framework based upon
perceived level of
control and perceived
relative importance

Risk Factors

IS project
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paradigm
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departments
[Keil et al., 2000]

[Kemerer and
Sosa, 1991]

15

[Kumar and Dissel,
1996]

Risk propensity, risk
perception

Model that considers
the affect of risk
propensity, level of sunk
cost, and risk
perception on
willingness to continue
a project

Probability that
undesirable
outcomes will
occur

IS project

Concept, technical
infeasibility, funding,
market creation,
telecommunica-tions,
vendors, interorganizational
systems, leading
edge, competitor
copying, over
subscription,
maintenance, exit
barriers, available
funding, technological
sophistication,
organizational
flexibility

Identification of barriers
to successful definition,
development, and
maintenance of
strategic information
systems

Scores on risk
factors

SIS project
or operation

Economic, technical,
socio-political

Identification of risks in
different types of IOIS

Risk
components

Inter-organizational info
systems

[Lee and Clark,
1997]

Transaction risks

Transaction risks are
analyzed to identify
adoption barriers

Risk
component

Reengineering

[Lyytinen et al.,
1998]

4+

Task, structure,
actors, technology,
and
interdependencies
among these

Use a sociotechnical
model of organizational
change to classify risks
– system, project, and
management sources.

Risk Factors
(sources)

IS project

Risk
management
reduces
risks

[Lyytinen et al.,
1998]

4+

Task, structure,
actors, technology,
and
interdependencies
among these

A contingent, contextual
and multivariate view of
software development
risk can help shape
management attention

Risk Factors
(sources)

IS project

Managers
address
risks through
sequential
attention
shaping and
intervention

Approach to minimize
risk

Not defined

EIS project

Coping with client –
based people problems
requires explicitness,
clarity, and formality

Factors

IS project

[Mohan et al.,
1990]
[Moynihan, 2002]

7

Unrealistic customer
expectations, lack of
real customer
ownership,
disagreement
amongst customer’s
people on project
goals, personal
deficiencies on part of
customer’s PM, user
resistance, presence
of hidden agendas,

A General, but Readily Adaptable Model of Information Risk by S. Alter and S.A. Sherer

26

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 14, 2004) 1-28

nasty politics by
customer
[McFarlan, 1981]

3

[McComb and
Smith, 1991]

Size, experience,
structure

Framework

Exposure to
consequences

IS project

Technical, human,
planning, executing

Framework with
heuristic guidelines

Risk Factors

IS project

[Nidumolu, 1995]

5

Process control,
product flexibility,
requirements
uncertainty, vertical
coordination,
horizontal
coordination,
performance risk

Vertical control reduces
performance risk and
increases control over
the process whereas
horizontal coordination
leads to flexible
software applications.
Performance risk
mediates the effect of
vertical coordination
and requirements
uncertainty on process
control.

Difficulty in
estimating
outcome

IS project

Mutual
adjustments
over time

[Nidumolu, 1996]

5

Process control,
product flexibility,
requirements
uncertainty, vertical
coordination,
horizontal
coordination,
performance risk

Performance risk is an
alternative to fit that
explains the effect of
coordination and
uncertainty on process
control and product
flexibility

Difficulty in
estimating
outcome

IS project

Adjust over
time

Professional issues,
executive/professional relationship,
executive
involvement issues,
information delivery
issues, information
quality, impact on
executive work, EIS
functions, ease of use

Rank ordered keys to
successful development

No definition

EIS project
and
operation

Physical threats,
unauthorized physical
or electronic access,
authorized physical or
electronic access

Risk analysis method
that employs a
combination of
qualitative and
quantitative
methodologies

Loss
expectancy

Operation

Two-stage contracting
model for software
design and
development

No definition

Software
project (outsourcing)

[Rainer and
Watson, 1995]

23
dev

38
ops

[Rainer et al., 1991]

22

[Richmond and
Seidmann, 1993]

[Scott and Vessey,
2002]

26

Organizational
context, IS context,
project

Risk factors in ERP
implementations

Risk Factors

ERP project

[Schmidt et al.,
2001]

53

Corporate
environment,
sponsorship,
ownership,
relationship
management, project

Authoritative list of
common risk factors
obtained from Delphi
survey in 3 countries

Risk Factors

IS project
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management, scope,
requirements,
funding, scheduling,
development process,
personnel, staffing,
technology, external
dependencies,
planning
[Sherer, 1992]

Software failure

Process for measuring
software risk

Probability
times loss

Software
operation

Financial risk,
security risk,
technology risk,
people risk,
information risk,
business process
risk, success risk

Identification of risk
components from focus
group

Components

IS project

Organizational
environment, IS
environment,
individual
characteristics

Approach that deals
with problem that
managers often lack
knowledge of controls

Probability
times loss

Operations

Competitive risk,
transition risk,
business partner risk

Identifies risk in
ecommerce

Components

Operations
(ecommerce)

[Vitale, 1986]

Changing basis of
competition, raising
entry barriers,
increasing switching
costs, changing
balance of power,
developing new
products

Framework to assess
risks

Components

Operation of
competitive
information
systems

[Yourstone and
Smith, 2002]

Active failures, latent
failures

Conceptual model for
managing system errors
that distinguishes
between active and
latent failures

Not defined

Operation
(health care
systems)

[Smith et al., 2001]

7

[Straub and Welke,
1998]

[Viehland, 2002]
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